From Rivals to Partners: Constructing the Sino-Indonesian Strategic Partnership

This study is an inquiry into the use of strategic partnerships as an instrument of diplomacy in Indonesia. Strategic partnerships have become a key fixture of Indonesia’s foreign policy in the post-Suharto era. However, the rationale behind the formation of strategic partnerships for Indonesia’s strategic interests, as well as the process behind its formation, remain understudied. This paper seeks to fill this gap in the literature by examining how Indonesia utilizes its strategic partnership to engage China. Using Wilkins’ analytical framework for the study of strategic partnerships, this study finds that Indonesian policymakers have used strategic partnerships to create multiple channels of communication for the purposes of economic pragmatism and the overarching goal of socializing the target state into accepting Indonesia’s vision of the international order. The case study on China indicates that strategic partnerships have only been partially successful in helping Indonesia deliver their goals. While increased formal interactions have facilitated economic and social interaction, the utility of strategic partnerships as instruments of influencing Chinese behaviour in the international system remains minimal.

INTRODUCTION rapprochement with Washington (Wilkins 2012: 67). In the post-Cold War era, strategic partnerships have been popularized by China, which it sees as instruments upon which 'serious imbalances in the international strategic alignment' could be addressed as the world heads 'toward multipolarity' (China White Paper 2006: 2). Today, there are over 100 different partnerships in Asia alone, with nearly each country having at least two established. The rapid proliferation of strategic partnerships has made it difficult to provide overarching conceptualizations and definitions, especially since strategic partnerships do come in different purposes and forms.
For this paper, I shall nonetheless broadly define "strategic partnerships" as structured and non-binding arrangements between two actors (whether between states or a state and a multilateral institution) that signal their desire to pursue a shared geostrategic vision and/or common economic and social interests. Before divulging in the components that distinguish strategic partnerships from normal ad hoc bilateral relations, it is important to highlight that alongside strategic partnerships are a wide variety of other forms of partnerships, such as "security partnerships" and "comprehensive partnerships." Some countries, such as Vietnam, have delineated the differences between forms of partnerships (Thayer 2013). However, for many countries, including Indonesia, the differences remain ambiguous and poorly defined.
For the purpose of this paper, strategic partnerships will be used as an umbrella term to refer to all forms of partnership. The exception here will be "comprehensive strategic partnerships," which denote an upgrade (at least symbolically) from a strategic partnership.
Strategic partnerships are distinguished by three components. First, strategic partnerships are often formed in order to pursue common strategic objectives, which are related to shared visions of regional security. Importantly, Wilkins highlights that strategic partnerships are "goal driven," not "threat driven." These partnerships are implanted by a "system principle," which display a shared conception of how the regional order should look like (for instance, the championship of multipolar order) (Wilkins, 2011: 68). States may be driven to form a strategic partnership if they perceive uncertainty in the international system and see a "strategic fit" with their prospective partner. These partnerships are consolidated through various procedural mechanisms that tie in security, economic, and sociocultural relations (Wilkins 2008: 365-366).
Second, strategic partnerships are a loose form of alignment (Parameswaran 2014). This allows strategic partners to concurrently be putative rivals (e.g. the Sino-Indian strategic partnership, Sino-Japanese strategic partnership). The emergence of a unipolar international order in the post-Cold War era has meant that there is little incentive for states to form alliances, especially since many states in the Indo-Pacific are economically interdependent on one another. Rather than forming coalitions to balance against the region's most powerful countries (Waltz 1979;Walt 1987), states in post-Cold War Asia have preferred to pursue forms of "limited alignment," which allow states to benefit from economic and security assistance from major powers, without sacrificing strategic autonomy (Ciorciari 2010). The lack of expectations in security-entailed commitments in strategic partnerships makes it an attractive form of alignment for states unwilling to commit to military alliances, like Indonesia. At the same time, strategic partnerships are not ad hoc groupings that have been formed to address particular challenges, but are rather broader mechanisms that guide future cooperation in addressing specific medium-to-long term issues (e.g. climate change, piracy) or address broader regional challenges (Wilkins 2012;Nadkani 2010;Envall and Hall 2016;Parameswaran 2014).
Third, strategic partnerships are multi-dimensional and help countries prioritize and structure their bilateral relationships with short, medium, and long-term visions. These partnerships are centred on finding strategic and economic opportunities for meaningful cooperation. When a strategic partnership is formed, they are often declared in the form of "joint declarations" or "joint statements" that highlight priority areas of cooperation.
Occasionally, they are followed by a "Plan of Action," which goes into detail the areas of cooperation that are pursued in the partnership. These agreements list various pledges that cover multiple aspects of a country's relationship. For instance, Indonesia's comprehensive strategic partnership with India does not only focus on shared conceptions of rule of law and order in the Indo-Pacific, but also cover palm oil trade, non-traditional maritime security, and infrastructure development. The multi-dimensional nature of strategic partnerships means that they often involve inter-ministerial cooperation, making the formation of strategic partnerships to be a whole-of-government endeavour that requires inputs from all relevant ministries.
According to Nadkarni (2010: 48-49), what distinguishes strategic partnerships from typical forms of diplomatic exchanges is that they introduce a 'structure of sustained and regularized interactions underpinned by multiple webs of institutionalization at the intergovernmental level that they encompass.' The inclusion of various different agencies and institutions is ideally meant to facilitate policy coordination. However, as evident in multiple studies on strategic partnerships (including this one), there is often great difficulty in following through with pledges made in the strategic partnership agreement (Wilkins 2008;Parameswaran 2014).

The use of Strategic Partnerships in Indonesia
A brainchild of Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda, strategic partnerships emerged as a fixture of Indonesian foreign policy in the 21 st century (Shekhar 2018: 197). As of 2019, Indonesia has signed partnership agreements with 13 countries, most of which in the Indo-Pacific (see Table 1), and two international organizations. The rationale behind Indonesia's strategic partnerships vary greatly. In the context of Indonesia's partnerships with major powers in the Indo-Pacific (namely China and the United States), strategic partnerships have tended to act as an instrument of engagement and hedging (Ross and Johnston 1999;Kuik 2008 Gulf Cooperation Council (2015) South Korea (2017) China (2013) (Hatta 1952). While Bebas-Aktif is an ambiguous concept, during the Cold War, it was often interpreted as guidance for Indonesian leaders to chart a middle pathway to get around the necessity of siding with either Cold War blocs. Leifer (1983: 173) argues that at its core, Bebas-Aktif is driven by a 'need to overcome an intrinsic vulnerability.' Close alignment with a great power during the Cold War could undermine political stability, as it could empower one group over the other. 2 While the United States emerged as the global unipolar in the post-Cold War era, Asia remained fraught with challenges emanating from major power rivalry (such as between China and Japan, China and India). A lack of stability-inducing mechanisms in the region created fears that Asia was "ripe for rivalry" (Friedberg 1993). In the dying months of the Soviet Union, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas (2001: 12) envisioned that 'competitive patterns among the multiple power centres will inevitably grow in complexity and unpredictability.' It is this "complexity" and "unpredictability" that Indonesian leaders have been trying to manage through the deployment of ASEAN-led institutional arrangements (such as the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum). Referred to by Goh as the strategy of "omni-enmeshment," Indonesia has attempted to draw major powers, such as China and the United States, into ASEAN-led mechanisms in an effort to involve and insert them into a web of exchanges and relationships with the long-term goal of integration (Goh 2007(Goh /2008. At the same time, the absence of intense great power rivalry has allowed Indonesia to diversify its economic and military relations amongst major powers, in an attempt to lessen dependence on a single major power.
Strategic partnerships are platforms used by Indonesian policymakers to try and enmesh major powers into regional norms and institutions and to diversify major power dependence.
First, strategic partnerships are borne out of a desire to balance the influence of great powers in Indonesia. Strategic partnerships allow Indonesia to engage and improve ties with all major powers in the Indo-Pacific. As Nadkarni (2010: 45) argues, the non-binding nature of strategic partnerships mean that they 'exemplify neither classic balancing nor bandwagoning behaviours but exhibits engage-and-resist or hedging strategies employed in shifting kaleidoscopic patterns by each dyad.' Strategic partnerships do not constrain Indonesia's strategic autonomy.
Rather, they allow Indonesia to strategically improve bilateral relations with certain countries without sending away signals that Indonesia is "siding" with one country or another. While the aim has been to reduce Indonesia's dependence on one particular great power, as Shekhar (2018: 198) highlights, in practice this meant 'diminishing Indonesia's dependence on the US that was seen as unreliable in times of emergency.' Relations with the United States, Indonesia's most important Cold War relationship, deteriorated after the Cold War due to the former's growing concern for the Suharto administration's human rights abuses (Novotny 2010: 121-127). Realizing the risks of dependence on one major power, Indonesian leaders have strived to improve its bilateral relations with other key powers. Among Indonesia's first few strategic partners are Russia, China, and Indiamajor regional powers that, coincidentally, stood opposite of the United States during the Cold War. Strategic partnerships with these major powers facilitated greater cooperation in important fields. For instance, the strategic partnership with Russia outlined a number of pledges to improve security ties as a means to reduce Indonesia's dependence on the United States as Indonesia's principal arms supplier (Shekhar 2018: 198-199).
Second, as a platform for facilitating omni-enmeshment, strategic partnerships are formed with the hope of facilitating Indonesia's vision of the regional order. In 2010, Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa conceptualized Indonesia's vision of the regional order through the concept of "dynamic equilibrium," which envisaged a cooperative system of power relations based on the creation and maintenance of an international system that nurtures trust amongst states through the acceptance of shared normsnamely, ASEAN's norms of peaceful resolution of conflict, self-restraint, and non-interference (Natalegawa 2018: 14-32). The Joko Widodo (Jokowi) administration hopes to progress these norms more broadly within the entirety of the Indo-Pacific (Marsudi 2018). Strategic partnerships work as instruments to help facilitate Indonesia's vision of the international order. As strategic partnerships require system principles, the Indonesian government has attempted to instil important norms and principles (such as the Bandung Principles) into partnership agreements as a means of signalling the norms and principles that Indonesia abides to. Moreover, enhanced interactions between Indonesian officials and officials from the target state give the Indonesian government the opportunity to influence the policy preferences and behaviours of target countries (Leifer 1999). The overarching purpose of strategic partnerships for Indonesia is, thus, to help diversify dependencies and engage them into accepting Indonesia's ideal vision of an inclusive international orderone where all major powers have a role to play.

A framework for studying Indonesia's strategic partnerships
With strategic partnerships characterized and its utility for Indonesia outlined, the next task is to understand how strategic partnerships are constructed. In order to examine how it is formed, I will be using an analytical framework proposed by Wilkins (2008). In his analysis of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, Wilkins offers an analytical framework that was inspired by studies in Organizational Studies examining how partnerships between firms were formed.
Wilkins' framework is divided into three modules, which closely examines and traces the phases of strategic partnership construction and maintenance: formation, implementation, and evaluation. The strength of Wilkins' framework is that it interrogates the rationality behind each module, which points out the intricacies of the studied state's approach to strategic partnerships.
At the outset, it is important to address some terminology. First, "comprehensive partnerships" and "strategic partnerships" do not denote much difference in definitional terms.
The decision to determine whether a partnership is "comprehensive" or "strategic" ultimately depends on the preferences of the two states forming the partnership, which may be influenced by historical or domestic political considerations. 3 Comprehensive strategic partnerships (CSP) or special strategic partnerships (SSP) are symbolically seen as an "upgrade" of the partnership.
Similarly, whether they are "comprehensive" or "special" is determined by the preferences of the states involved. From an operational perspective, a CSP/SSP outline a more diverse set of goals. However, they do not necessarily indicate that the partnership that preceded it has been working well.

Formation
Despite its growing prominence as a feature of Indonesia's foreign policy, there is no set criteria or checklist for determining which countries are selected as a strategic partner. In some instances, policymakers may not see a need to form a strategic partnership with some countries, such as Malaysia and Singapore, as the bilateral relationship already involves multiple channels of communication. 4 However, Indonesia does not use strategic partnerships merely as a means of constructing frameworks that guide bilateral relations that it deems underdeveloped. Evident of this is that Indonesia possesses strategic partnerships with Japan and Australia, two states that it has comprehensive ties with even prior to the formation of a partnership. For a state to be a strategic partner, there must be an economic and geostrategic impetus.
First, the strategic partnership must be driven by economic, political, and sociocultural objectives. These objectives are based on the government's economic and security priorities.
The strategic partnership formed with South Korea in 2006 was not disassociated from the Yudhoyono administration's goal of strengthening Indonesia's local defence industry, as well as tapping into the growing energy demands of East Asia's growing middle class. According to an interview with an Indonesian diplomat, "tangible economic interests," particularly for Jokowi's infrastructure projects, are a central focus in the decision to upgrade strategic partnerships under the Jokowi administration. 5 For instance, the decision by the Jokowi administration to "upgrade" the partnership with South Korea to a "special strategic partnership" was driven by a desire to attract both more South Korean investors to fund Indonesia's infrastructure boom (Yonhap News 2017). 6 Second, the target state's profile, power, and influence within either its region or the wider international system is examined to see how they can play a role in helping Indonesia pursue certain normative or geostrategic objectives. This factor, referred to by Wilkins as "system principles," provide the partnership with a wider strategic meaning. For instance, one leading drive to "upgrade" the partnership with India to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2018 was to encourage India to accept Indonesia's Indo-Pacific vision. 7 Alternatively, Indonesia may use this relationship as an entry point into regions that it lacks influence. The Yudhoyono administration's desire to play a more active role in the developing world explains its decision to form a strategic partnership with South Africa and Brazil, which are regional powers in Africa and Latin America, respectively.
If a state is able to satisfy Indonesia's geostrategic and economic interests, Indonesia may consider forming (or alternatively, accepting) a strategic partnership with the target state. It is, however, important for the partnership to be seen as favourable by the Indonesian public, as domestic politics can obstruct progress on partnership negotiations. This was the experience in the early years of negotiation for a strategic partnership with the United States.
Talks over the formation of a strategic partnership commenced in 2007. 8  to Jakarta, that a partnership was signed. Even then, Indonesia proposed calling it a "comprehensive partnership", as "strategic" denoted a stronger security component. 9 Since Indonesia's transition to democracy, an empowered post-Suharto legislature has begun asserting influence over the foreign policymaking process. Indonesian governments must be cautious in managing ties with the United States, China or any other major powers, as they could be accused of "leaning" too close to a major power (Dosch 2006).

Implementation
The implementation stage concerns the building and maintenance of the strategic partnership, particularly how new channels of communications are formed and institutionalized. The initial starting point between diplomats in both Indonesia and the target state would be on the system principles that justify the formation of a strategic partnership. These principles highlight shared geostrategic visions between Indonesia and the target state, which may range from the pursuit of a strengthened multilateral system (e.g. Brazil, South Africa) to a shared commitment to maintaining a balance of influence amongst major powers in East Asia (e.g. Vietnam, South Korea).
Once the system principles are determined, both states negotiate the operational aspects of the partnership. The development of the strategic partnership can be understood as a "twolevel" process, whereby policymakers must negotiate with both foreign diplomats and domestic stakeholders (Putnam 1988). Once KEMLU reaches an agreement with foreign diplomats over the possible formation of a strategic partnership, they form formal working groups and invite other relevant ministries and members of civil society and academia to provide inputs. For instance, if KEMLU sees an opportunity for developing maritime cooperation with one country, they will involve ministries like Defence and Marine Affairs and Fisheries to gather their inputs and ensure policy coordination once the partnership is formed. Meanwhile, the purpose of inviting non-government stakeholders to deliberate in the strategic partnership process is to ensure that they play an important role in helping to maintain the strategic partnership once it has been signed. 10 As mentioned in previous sections, strategic partnerships are distinguished by more regularized interactions between various levels of government and representatives or members of the public (whether they are in political parties or civil society). 11 Joint committees (domestic inter-agency and between officials from Indonesia and the target state) are formed to pursue the objectives listed in the strategic partnership agreement. Both states also decide how frequent senior government officials, particularly ministers and heads of governments, should meet. Factors that determine the frequency of high-level meetings include the strategic importance of the prospective strategic partner, purpose, and hopes of a high-level meeting, and the resources needed for regular summits. Once there is a consensus between diplomats in Indonesia and the target state on the system principles, operational objectives, and formal mechanisms for long-term cooperation, the final draft of the strategic partnership agreement is sent to cabinet, where they will be examined for a final review. 12 Ministers may give last minute inputs, before it is officially approved. The agreementwhether they are in the form of a joint statement or declarationwill normally be signed by the president (though sometimes just the foreign minister) in an official ceremony with their counterparts.

Evaluation
Evaluation is an ongoing and indefinite process (until the partnership terminates). 13 Once a strategic partnership is signed, it is monitored by KEMLU through a series of mechanisms.
First, senior officials meet either regularly or in an ad hoc manner to review the progress of

RESEARCH METHOD
This study has employed two primary research methods to understand the development of the Sino-Indonesian strategic partnership. The first approach is an analysis of documentary data, which aims to understand the issues that Indonesia and China prioritize in the relationship over time. The documentary data gathered included foreign ministry reports on the strategic partnership, as well as the agreements signed between the Indonesian and Chinese governments. The second is a decision-making approach, which focuses on the perceptions and interests of key decision-makers and how they affect the development of the strategic partnership. This research benefits from qualitative research interviews with serving and retired officials from the Indonesian foreign ministry, which were conducted from December 2017 until October 2018.

The Sino-Indonesian Strategic Partnership
This section of the paper will utilize the framework proposed by Wilkins (2008) to examine the rationale behind the formation, implementation, and evaluation of Indonesia's strategic partnership with China. The final sub-section of this section will examine why the strategic partnership was upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership.

Formation
Compared to its relationship with other major powers, Indonesia's relations with China uniquely stands out, due to China's geographic proximity, troubled history between the two The third priorityand the system principlewas to ensure peace and stability in the region by enmeshing China into ASEAN-led institutions and norms. Although relations with China had improved by the 2000s, China was still seen as a long-term strategic threat, especially due to its adventurism in the South China Sea in the 1990s (Novotny 2010). Since the normalization of ties in 1990, Indonesia has attempted to assuage Chinese assertiveness and, potential revisionism, by engaging it into ASEAN's string of norms and institutions (Wanandi 1996: 124-127 Zhou Enlai also attended and took the opportunity to project a more conciliatory image of China, impressing Indonesia's leaders (Mozingo 1976: 120-125). The conference was thus a turning point in the early years of Sino-Indonesian relations, as it triggered a bond between Sukarno and Zhou. Both Hu and Yudhoyono revived that moment as a benchmark in bilateral relations (Arnold 2010: 39-40).
The Joint Agreement consisted of five thematic and 28 operational clauses. While operational clauses indicate the practical objectives of the partnership, thematic clauses highlight the normative agreements that the two powers share, as well as outline some shared regional and international goals. The first thematic clause highlighted the non-aligned and nonexclusive nature of the new strategic partnership, which signalled the two states' rejection of military alliances. Other thematic clauses include a reiteration of the TAC and placed the partnership as one of the pillars of the pre-existing ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership. The 28 operational clauses were divided into three categories: political and security, economic and development, and sociocultural and other cooperation. These clauses, cover a wide range of issues, ranging from maritime cooperation to stepping up dialogue and consultation in energy policy. Certain values were also listed in these operational clauses, including respect for territorial integrity, multilateralism, and, interestingly, respect for human rights and democracy.
The procedural aspects of the strategic partnership were slow to kickstart. Following the signing of the strategic partnership, KEMLU consulted various domestic stakeholders from government, civil society, and academia to follow it through with a more detailed proposal.
However, it was only in January 2010 that a Plan of Action was signed. The Plan of Action added more operational clauses highlighting the priorities pursued, including cooperation on energy, fisheries, and investment. Economic interests dominated the Plan of Action, with most points surrounding trade and investment cooperation (including points on expediting the progress of certain infrastructure projects). The Plan of Action also proposed the formation of a series of joint dialogues and summits between government officials, ministers, and heads of states of the two states, who would meet whenever necessary to coordinate policy and pursue these priorities. However, the Plan of Action was not specific in outlining the targets that it sought to achieve. Most points simply indicate a commitment to "enhance dialogue" or "promote cooperation" without clearly indicating any quantifiable measurement of success.
For instance, despite a desire to increase tourism and trade, no specific numerical target is underlined.

Evaluation
Once the Plan of Action was signed, KEMLU moved to pursue the goals outlined in the Plan. Despite these developments, Indonesian diplomats interviewed had argued that the strategic partnership had been considered initially disappointing, due to its dormancy until the 2010s.  Korea, and the Philippines in recent years. 42 This may indicate that Indonesia has benefited more from China through the CSP than the other way around. Thus, in encouraging China to adhere to regional norms and institutions, Indonesian leaders have primarily been dependent on private (though regularized) high-level discussions between the two states. Through this method alone, however, success may be more dependent on Chinese willingness to be cooperative rather than any Indonesian effort.

CONCLUSION
Strategic partnerships have emerged as a mainstay of Indonesian diplomacy in the 21 st century.
The importance of strategic partnerships to Indonesian diplomacy are both regional and bilateral in scope, possessing the purpose of pursuing domestic political and economic objectives, as well as broader international objectives. The Sino-Indonesian strategic partnership and subsequent comprehensive strategic partnership heralded a new chapter in their diplomatic history. After decades of animosity, Indonesia and China now possess burgeoning economic and diplomatic relations, underpinned by growing social and economic interconnectivity. A convergence of economic and strategic interests is highlighted in regularized interactions between high-ranking government officials, which attempt to coordinate policies between the two states to settle potential problems and address challenges to improved economic relations.
Despite initial enthusiasm in the signing of the strategic partnership in 2005, a lack of commitment and declining enthusiasm led to the slow implementation of the strategic partnership. Slow implementation and lack of support from the top have meant that the strategic partnership did not reach its full potential. It was only in the 2010s that we saw significant growth in the number of multiple channels of communication between the two states. The CSP signed eight years after the strategic partnership was meant to revive the enthusiasm of the 2005 signing. The CSP has been successful in increasing formal interactions and helping to expedite the signing of agreements that contribute to growing social and economic interconnectivity between the two states. But its effectiveness as a platform to encourage China to adhere to regional norms and institutions, especially those centred around ASEAN, is largely dependent on Chinese willingness rather than any Indonesian attempt to influence Chinese foreign policy. Nonetheless, regularized high-level interactions allow for the leaders of the two states to regularly communicate their ideas and positions. Though, the effects of these interactions on Chinese foreign policy are not entirely clear and do not seem to be entirely effective, as Chinese adventurism in the South China Sea continued years after the signing of the CSP.
The strategic partnership between Indonesia and China was an early attempt in Indonesia's use of strategic partnership diplomacy, a process that it had to gradually learn.
While much can be learned from the experience of the strategic partnership with China for the general study of Indonesia's strategic partnership diplomacy, individual case studies should be considered, as they are tailored by specific domestic political, historical, and bureaucratic interests. Future studies can also focus more on the failings and successes of the CSP as an