Latent Securitisation of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing in Indonesia

This paper aims to explore and explain to what extent and in what ways the Indonesian Government has securitised the Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing in Indonesia since 2009, by utilising critical discourse analysis. Using the Securitisation theory from the Copenhagen School, this paper explains the analysis of the speech act and extraordinary measures from SBY’s administration, Jokowi’s first term and second term administration. While IUU fishing has been a severe global issue, 30 percent of the cases take place in Indonesia and it becomes a serious threat for the economy and maritime resources. In 2009, Indonesia amended the fisheries law by establishing the new article about the right to burn and sink illegal foreign vessels. However, the securitisation remained ‘latent’ as it lacks the extraordinary measures and supporting speech act from the government. In 2014, during Jokowi’s first term, Indonesia had done extraordinary measures by regularly sinking the illegal foreign vessels. During Jokowi’s second term, the measures were gone, although the law still exists. Thus, it became ‘latent’ again in 2019 up until present. This paper claims that the Indonesian Government successfully securitised the issue in 2014 after the latent securitisation that happened in 2009. However, it remained ‘latent’ again in 2019 up until now.


INTRODUCTION
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing activities have been a vital problem in Indonesian maritime history. As the largest archipelagic country that is dominated by ocean, the Fisheries Management Areas of the Republic of Indonesia (WPP-NRI) is vast.
Based on the Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) records in 2014, Indonesia ranked second as the biggest marine fisheries producer in the world with 6 million tonnes of production (Fitra, 2016). It has consistently ranked second after China up to 2016 (FAO, 2018). Because of that, Indonesian maritime sector considerably contributes to Indonesian economy. Thus, losing the maritime resources caused by IUU fishing actions, has severe effects on its social, politics, and economic condition. By 2004, Indonesia has lost USD 2 billion each year due to IUU fishing (Perwita, 2004). While in 2016, Indonesian President, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) claimed that Indonesia lost USD 20 billion each year because of IUU fishing (Fitra, 2016 The consequences are affecting the country and it becomes a problematic issue. OECD (2004) stated that IUU fishing issue is a dynamic and multi-faceted problem with no single strategy that can reduce this issue, thus a concrete approach is needed at all levels: national, international, regional, and global. Some policies had been taken regionally, such as in European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN). In 2010, one of the EU policies was a trade barrier that was given in the export and import sector, where they only allowed legal marine fisheries product only by the competent flag states to enter EU market (ec.europe.eu, 2010). In Indonesia, some policies and initiatives have been taken differently depending on the incumbent president and administration. In 2010, Indonesia set the priorities for 2010-2014 in community development and empowerment through programmes for small-scale fishers to address IUU fishing issue. Indonesia also prioritised a mitigation and adaptation strategy to climate change for the marine and fisheries sector, as well as to strengthen the systems to improve management and combat IUU fishing (FAO, 2020).
These priorities seem to neglect the law that had been created in 2009. Another interesting study about securitisation can be found in a paper titled "Unilateral Policy to tackle the Australian Illegal Immigrant after the election in 2013" that was written by Fakhrul Rizal Razak (2018). It explained about the securitisation process and mentioned about "resecuritisation" as the continuation of a securitisation, also as the next phase of the previous securitisation. Resecuritisation process could happen with and without de-securitisation process. In a case study, Razak reviewed resecuritisation as a securitisation that happened in the later administration in the same issue or context as the previous securitisation in different administration or actor. From his paper, I would say that resecuritisation is a different term with latent securitisation that I use, and resecuritisation would only take place if the previous process of securitisation is a success.
Later after a securitisation is completed, an issue could still be securitised, or it could be de-securitised. The concept of de-securitisation is not getting as much attention as securitisation, and I will not explain about it specifically in this paper. It is still debatable and viewed from different perspectives among scholars. Buzan (1998) defined desecuritisation as "shifting issues out of emergency mode into normal bargaining processes of the political sphere" (Bechtle, 2019). It is a process towards a normal political condition without any emergency measures. In a master thesis titled "Securitization and Desecuritisation of Climate Change in the US under the Obama and Trump Administration", Bechtle (2019) argued that the issues within the realm of "normal politics" do not require restrictive measure, thus this concept is still debatable, and each scholar has preference to justify de-securitisation process. Kurniawan (2018) proposed four components of desecuritisation, which are: desecuritising actors, the desecuritisation speech act, audience, and facilitating conditions. In the desecuritisation process, the actors involved are not limited to the state only, but also open for non-state actors.
In the context of IUU fishing in Indonesia, I think that the issue has never been de-securitised. This is supported by Waever's process of de-securitisation, in which to de-securitise an issue, it absolutely requires the de-existentialisation of threats (Bechtle, 2019 School who have also contributed to the existing theory of "Securitisation". Securitisation, a theory that is used for this paper, is a process of raising an issue to the degree of general consideration as an urgent matter (Buzan, et al. 1998: 24). "To securitise" means considering an issue to be a security issue. To securitise, Buzan et al. emphasised that the issue should be presented as an existential threat to a designated referent object, and it needs extraordinary measures and justifying actions outside the normal political procedure. Thus, the keyword is the existential threat, referent object and the extraordinary measure. Defining "Existential threat" relatively depends on the "referent object". Buzan (1998: 2) explains that existential threats are conventionally defined in terms of the constituting principle, such as sovereignty or the state ideology.
However, such threat (sovereignty or ideology) is a threat for a state. Thus, there is no universal definition of existential threat because it can only be understood in relations to the character of the referent object. In addition, Williams (2008: 6) defined threat in the security sphere, as a thing that if left unchecked could threaten the survival of a referent object in the near future.
As threat is threatening the survival of a referent object, referent object has a legitimate claim to survive. Referent object is the one who can say, "It has to survive; therefore, it is necessary to…" (Buzan et al, 1998). The referent object is not always a state. There are other referent objects in the security issue, such as sub-state actor, firms, humankind, or even individual (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 4). Then, to understand the referent object, it is necessary to understand the level of analysis of the issue. Barry Buzan (1998: 5-6) explained that there are five levels of analysis, which are: International System, International subsystems, units, sub-units, and individuals.
However not all those levels can be securitised. There is other factor that should be considered as part of the securitisation process, which is: securitisation move.
Securitisation move is an attempt to securitise an issue by labelling the issue as a security issues through speech act, while speech act is defined as the act of 'saying security' (People and Vaughan- Williams, 2010: 76). As the pioneer of securitisation theory, Waever claimed that the idea of securitisation draws heavily on the theory of language, that he called "speech act theory". It is using the power of language to make the issue receive attention from the public. Thus, to make a securitisation move as a part of the securitisation process, the speech act is necessary. To understand the whole process of securitisation, it is also necessary to know the Securitisation 'spectrum' that was introduced by Buzan. The spectrum explains that securitisation runs from non-politicised (not a political issue), then it becomes politicised (considered by the public as something important), then it is securitised (means that it is considered as a threat and extraordinary measure is needed) (Buzan, 1998: 23), as demonstrated in the figure below. Figure 2. Securitisation spectrum and the conditions Source: author's compilation extracted from Buzan (1998) The securitisation process is not as simple as what Buzan has explained, thus some conditions are needed. For example, before securitising an issue, it should be qualified as an existential threat to a referent object in a particular level (national, regional or global).
To determine whether something is a threat or not, a recent study claimed that a perception of other state/non-state actors will affect the whole decision-making process. The role of the subject in understanding the possible threat becomes a central factor in seeing something as a threat or not (Kartikasari, 2019: 181). Then, to politicise an issue and make it as a public attention, speech act is a mandatory condition. However, not everyone can give a speech act. Speech act works if it is said by someone powerful or in authority (in the level of the referent object is). It is also should be in the right context and according to certain pre-established conventions (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 77). Buzan called these as felicity conditions, which need to be fulfilled in order to be a successful speech act.
After being politicised, to securitise an issue, it requires an extraordinary measure as the final condition of the securitisation process. Extraordinary measure is any action that is taken in order to follow the speech act as an action to tackle the existential threat that is acted outside the normal politics. Thus, it is 'extraordinary'. Because it is beyond the normal politics. Without any extraordinary measure, the securitisation process is not complete. This is what I imply in this research as a 'latent securitisation'. to what extent the measures had been taken. While the speech act is not merely a speech, but also refers to the publication in official documents or legal regulations. Thus, this paper will closely analyse the actors, discourses, policies and impacts in each administration.

RESEARCH METHOD
The research of this paper uses critical discourse analysis as a method of analysis. Thus, the data that is needed for this type of analysis is discourses. The discourses as research data were collected from primary and secondary data. The primary data is the national law and official documents. Law is considered as primary data as it has a legal power, while the official documents represent the official report and statement from the government or trusted organisation such as FAO. Then, the secondary data for this research are speeches and news articles that were published between 2009 to the present.
This research also used the previous research and journal that is relevant to the issue and can make the research process easier.
The discourse analysis was chosen because the role of the "speech act" is very Indonesia has securitised IUU fishing issue.

DISCUSSION
As previously explained, the discussion and findings section consist of three parts or sub- However, due to the slow process, some cases were gone by the pre-trial lawsuit. In some cases, even when the government won the trial, the illegal fisher just needed to pay the fine and the case would be closed. There was no more punishment other than a fine, and there were probabilities that the illegal fishers would come back again. In the end of 2009, the Government changed the Minister into Fadel Muhammad. One of the speech acts that perhaps closely related to the maritime security is: The President (SBY) asked to protect the natural resources for the benefit of Indonesian people. President said that Indonesia is a maritime country, so we need to take care of the maritime condition (Kompas.com, 2009).
Although he mentioned about "taking care of the maritime condition", surprisingly most of the policy during Fadel's period were about export and import. It cannot be said that the securitisation process of IUU fishing was a total failure during SBY's administration because some Ministers had concerns towards the maritime issue, although it was not followed by actions. During this administration, the law to burn or sink the illegal vessels was also established. So, this showed that there was an effort to politicise this issue. However, the regulation was not followed by consistent extraordinary measures. Without any following law enforcement or "extraordinary measure", this securitisation process remained 'latent'.

He chose new ministers for his new administration. For the Minister of Maritime Affairs
and Fisheries, he chose Susi Pudjiastuti to deliver his vision and mission for the next five years. He had a vision to make Indonesia as a sovereign and independent state.
More specifically, his main mission is (DetikNews, 2014): To achieve national security that is able to maintain territorial sovereignty, sustain economic independence by securing maritime resources, and reflect the identity of Indonesia as an archipelagic country.
From this mission, it is clear how he would like to achieve national security through protecting the maritime resources that Indonesia has. As Indonesia also has a great maritime history, once again, he would like to rebuild the image of the great archipelagic maritime country. This mission was clearly delivered during his campaign, far before he was elected. In the later years, he showed that it was not just a campaign, it was not just a "speech act", but also followed by an "extraordinary measure". At the ministerial level, the mission initially could be found on the first speech of Minister Susi Pudjiastuti during her inauguration day as the minister on 29 th October. She said:

I receive this job because I think my 33 years of experiences in fisheries
and 10 years of experiences in aviation can help Indonesia to be better. We should be the host in our own country, building our own pride. With the ocean 70% or 5 times bigger than Thailand, and even thousands time bigger than Malaysia, unfortunately our exports are down below them. This will be our target! From her speech, she sought to build an identity of a maritime country, make Indonesian maritime sector great again, and boost the maritime economy. This is also coherent with what she said during an interview, that she wanted to make all fishermen … Enough with that! Do not catch them. Sink them directly! Following his speech, later in November and December 2014, some actions of sinking vessels were publicised by the media and had become a national and regional concern. In the next speech in the National Development Planning Forum in December 2014, Jokowi said : Two months ago, I ordered directly, for the vessels that still dare to enter our waters illegally and violate the law, I ordered to immediately sink them! However, the order was up to three times until finally we sank them During his speech, Jokowi emphasised how Indonesia has suffered from illegal fishing every year. With 5,000 to 6,000 fishing vessels every year in Indonesia, 90% of them are illegal  Although SBY's administration claimed that they had also sunken at least 32 illegal vessels in 2009, but cases from the following years continued to be low in number. The documentation and publication of this law enforcement was also difficult to track, compared to Jokowi's first term that is easier to track because the government used the media to blow up the policy and announced the achievement annually. From this figure, the gap is so big that it is not comparable. This period during Minister Susi is also interesting to be observed as she was massively criticized, nationally and regionally. However, the government showed its consistency and its willingness to enforce the law regardless the criticisms. The administration under Jokowi also showed how Indonesia as a sovereign state, has every right to use the law to punish illegal fishers. illegal vessels (Muhaimin, 2015). Not just the neighbouring countries, the Chinese Government also criticised Indonesia after China's illegal vessels were exploded. China said that it was important to maintain the fisheries cooperation between Indonesia and China, and the China's government was not happy with Indonesia's action to sink the illegal vessels (Radityo, 2015).
The other criticism came from a member of the House of Representatives (DPR RI) Commission VI, Bambang Harjo who underlined how the policy was destroying bilateral relations with neighbouring countries and harming the ocean (Bisnis.com, 2015 Her speech demonstrated how she had the power to enforce the law, and she was not afraid to execute the policy regardless the criticisms that came from inside or outside the nations. This effort could be seen as an extraordinary measure, as the policy was beyond the normal politics. As part of her extraordinary measure to securitise IUU fishing issue, in 2015 Jokowi has also established the Presidential Regulation No.115 on the Task Force to eradicate illegal fishing. The high achievement of illegal vessels number that had been sunken was because of this task force. One ministry cannot execute this alone, and cooperation between institutions are needed, including the cooperation between the ministry and the navy in creating this special task force. Overall, Jokowi's first term administration showed their best effort to securitise IUU fishing through the extraordinary measures of using the law, powerful "speech acts", sinking the vessels, and creating the IUU fishing special task force. The number of sunken vessels also shows us how this securitisation efforts were a successful securitisation compared to the previous administration.

Latent Securitisation under Jokowi's Second Term Administration (2019 -Present)
With Edhy's speech on his inauguration as the new minister, he said that the focus of the Ministry is to improve the relations between the Government and the fishermen (Ambari, 2019). Once again, it is showing that the priority is not going to the maritime security, the concern is going to the maritime society, the human resources. Regarding the sinking illegal foreign vessels, Minister Edhy chose to not sink the illegal vessels, but handing the caught illegal vessels to the local fishermen (Safitri, 2019). Until January 2020, at least there are 10 illegal vessels that were caught by Indonesian government, but they were not sunken. The government chose to hand the vessels to some schools or fishermen so it would be useful. Moreover, rather than focusing on sinking the illegal vessels, Minister Edhy is focusing the ministry in increasing the society's welfare, especially the fishermen. His decision shows how the 'extraordinary measure' is gone and become an ordinary measure. Thus, the securitisation of IUU fishing in the on-going Jokowi's second term of administration remains 'latent'.
Unlike the previous sub-section that is showing a comparative figure of the sunken vessel, the current administration cannot be compared as the total number of sunken vessels is zero. However, a 'latent' securitisation does not indicate that it is completely gone or de-securitised. As previously explained, latent means it is existing, but lying dormant or hidden, not yet developed. There is a possibility to resurrect this policy and complete the securitisation process in Jokowi's second term of administration. However, it is going back to the priority of the government. If Indonesia thinks that IUU fishing is not an important issue, then the current action to not fully-securitise the issue is its choice as a sovereign state. However, Indonesia still could improve this by continuing the previous policy or distinctly changing the law into a better version and propose a more distinct punishment than previous years.

CONCLUSION
To what extent and what ways, the Indonesian Government has securitised Illegal, there seemed to be no extraordinary measures during SBY's administration. Using the Securitisation spectrum from Copenhagen School, this paper would like to introduce a new concept of "Latent Securitisation" where there is no extraordinary measure, but it has been well-politicised (for example, by establishing a new law). With the law, it is a justification to have an extraordinary measure. However, during SBY's administration, the measure remains 'ordinary' and there is no strong "speech act" from the government to support the law. Thus, the IUU fishing issue in SBY's administration is latent.
It is then used by the next administration to resurrect the power that had been lying dormant for securitising IUU fishing issue. Jokowi's first term used the law to justify its actions to sink illegal foreign vessels. During Jokowi's first term, Indonesia also created the task force that is responsible in tackling IUU fishing issue. With this newly established task force, figure shows that the number of sunken vessels increased, and the issue became a priority and caught the attention of people nationally, regionally, and globally. From the speech acts that were delivered by President Jokowi and Minister Pudjiastuti, it also supported the action and distinctly showing how Indonesia is securitising this issue.
While it has successfully securitised IUU fishing issue during Jokowi's first term administration, this securitisation becomes 'latent' again now. The changing vision, mission and minister is absolutely shifting the priority and Indonesia's perspective on how to tackle IUU fishing issue. While the law is still existing, this paper concludes that we are facing a latent securitisation again towards IUU fishing issue.