THE ARCHITECTURE OF PARADIPLOMACY REGIME IN INDONESIA:
A CONTENT ANALYSIS

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Abstract
Paradiplomacy as a policy and practice of foreign policy by local governments have been carried out by the Indonesian government. But the practice of paradiplomacy shows a gap between local governments, as there are local governments that are so intensive but, on the other hand, some are passive. This article explains the architecture of paradiplomacy in the constitutional dimension through tracking the message structure in a number of regulations with content analysis methods. The advance of content analysis in the constitutional dimension will be able to provide comprehensive analysis on the architecture of Indonesia’s paradiplomacy and its implications for achieving national interests. This article finds that Indonesia’s paradiplomacy architecture is still very administrative, procedural, and technical, which results in inability to accelerate paradiplomacy by local governments in Indonesia to progressively attain local and national interests.

Keywords:
paradiplomacy, content analysis, central government, local government, authority
INTRODUCTION

The great debate about paradiplomacy in the study of IRs emerged in Realist and Constructivism schools. The realist school views foreign policy as part of the exclusive rights of the central government that cannot be contested. Foreign policy which is very unique, must be managed by state units that have sufficient internal capacity to neutralise a number of threats. International relations actors who do not have adequate capacity, only complicate the international order, and can even be counterproductive in achieving national interests. Very different from the realist school, constructivism school views paradiplomacy as a norm of democratisation of foreign policy. The central government as the main actor in international relations tends to display a monolithic pattern of behaviour that actually causes problems in the international order. The lack of creativity of the central government, which tends to be bureaucratic makes the effectiveness of achieving national interests less productive (Chatterji & Saha, 2017).

The development of paradiplomacy began after the end of World War II. The fundamental background of the rise of paradiplomacy was to promote and strengthen the post-war peace building and reconciliation among European countries specifically initiated by France and Germany. In the post-World War II, the concept of decentralisation became incredibly popular among European countries in order to accelerate the post-war development process (Bennett, 1990). Since then, local governments in France were competing to establish international cooperation with cities in the world, especially in Germany (Clave, 2006).

In the meantime, some cities in the United States (US) were also competing to build international network through paradiplomacy cooperation with some cities across the world. This policy was primarily initiated by the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG). The term of sister city or "City Diplomacy" was massively promoted by several cities in the US. Therefore, in 2005, the US local cities association established the biggest local cities association called C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40) (van der Pluijm & Melissen, 2007). The federal system of the United States of America has given opportunities for sub state governments to accelerate international cooperation (McMillan, 2010).

In Brazil for instance, Marcos Vinícius Isaias Mendes and Ariane Roder Figueira revealed that the city of Rio de Janeiro, was a success story of how the practice of paradiplomacy was implemented. Not surprisingly, the implementation of paradiplomacy in Rio is because of the full support of the government in, at least, two aspects: adequate
infrastructure and government policy, especially the New Public Management (NPM) which produce two important regulations namely Centro de Operações do Rio de Janeiro (COR) and Secretaria Especial de Concesses e Parcerias Público-Privadas (SECPAR). SECPAR was formed to encourage, coordinate and monitor the implementation of so-called "public-private partnerships". COR is an autonomous body established to support and monitor the City of Rio from the aspects of civil defence, urban mobility, and accident prevention, supported by all departments at the city level. The goal is to make the city of Rio more stable and secure in order to resolve various issues such as floods, landslides, fires and traffic accidents. The impact of the policy has been remarkable, as the City of Rio was able to work together in the context of "paradiplomacy" and stood equally with other Olympic cities like Barcelona and London (Mendes & Figueira, 2017).

Meanwhile, another interesting research was also conducted by Tridivesh Singh Maini on the paradiplomacy practices between New Delhi and Beijing. Maini’s analysis demonstrated that the foundation of the success of diplomatic relations between India and China is strong cooperation between New Delhi and Beijing. Both cities were able to be the driving force of cooperation in various fields such as trade, harmonious relations between people and tourism. Cooperation between cities in the south and north of India-China managed to initiate a regional economic cooperation forum involving surrounding countries such as the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Regional Economic Cooperation Forum (BCIM) which eventually became the foundation of BCIM Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC) (Maini, 2015). The corridor connects the cities of Kunming (China), Kolkata (India), Mandalay (Myanmar), and Chittagong and Dhaka (Bangladesh) (Rashid, 2013).

In the context of Indonesia, paradiplomacy should be developed amidst the government’s limitations in managing foreign relations (Ziyad, 2015). Moreover, in the era of decentralisation, most of the local leaders have yet to take maximum advantage from paradiplomacy in order to improve the quality of public sectors such as trade, education, transportation, tourism, environment and others. Nurul Isnaeni’s analysis on the paradiplomacy practices in the city of Surabaya can be used as a lesson for other heads of regions. In fact, with various advantages and disadvantages Isnaeni stated that paradiplomacy became an effective mechanism for Surabaya City to succeed in its development agenda (Isnaeni, 2013).

Furthermore, Dyah Estu Kurniawati's research also shows a similar trend that paradiplomacy has become one of the effective mechanisms to strengthen the capacity of
local government with its abundant resources. In the local government of Malang, East Java for instance, paradiplomacy has indeed brought positive impact on local regional development. However, there have also been negative consequences of paradiplomacy, especially towards the community, if the quality of implementation is poor due to the bad system and coordination among local government apparatus. The weak coordination would influence the community and the programs itself although the local government has abundant natural resources. The key is coordination at the local government level, which should run smoothly, effectively and efficiently (Kurniawati, 2010).

The significance of a study on paradiplomacy in constitution dimensions in Indonesia is to provide a map of ideas on Indonesia's paradiplomacy. Does the map of ideas reflect the norm of democratisation on foreign policy? Or does it reflect an artificial one? Content analysis is needed to read, trace and evaluate main ideas of paradiplomacy. The big question raised in this article is what Indonesian paradiplomacy architecture looks like in the structure of local government policy. Is Indonesia's paradiplomacy policy very substantial, or is it procedural?

**ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**

The study of international cooperation became an important post-Cold War discourse. The ideological competition in the Cold War era experienced a very significant change. Even the pattern of relationships that were previously based on rivalries became patterns of relationships based on partnership (Priyandita, 2019). In a number of regions, patterns of cooperation between countries have also emerged. A study from Kusumaningrum (2019) shows an increasing regionalism cooperation in the Caribbean region. A new phenomenon was demonstrated with the increase of international cooperation initiated by local actors (Ramadhan, 2019). A study from Lestari (2016) found that local issues were an interesting discourse in international cooperation like South Korea's cooperation, such as with Vietnam for rural development in Vietnam through the Semaul Undong model. The study of Luerdi (2019) also shows a new phenomenon that highlighted local actors in the articulation of foreign politics di Turkey.

The term paradiplomacy was introduced as an academic discourse through two important events. First, the term paradiplomacy was first discovered in the scientific journal Publius, published in fall 1984. In that edition the Publius Journal published a special issue entitled "Federal States and International Relations". Ivo Duchacek is an author who first introduced the term paradiplomacy in his article entitled "The
International Dimension of Subnational Self-Government”, by taking case studies of provinces in Canada, states in Germany and the United States. Ivo Duchacek also articulated ideas about the importance and significance of the practice of diplomacy carried out by local governments for improving people's welfare (Tavares, 2016).

The second event is an international seminar organized by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and took place at the University of Alberta in March 1985. In this conference, the idea of paradiplomacy practiced by the province of Quebec, Canada, really attracted the attention of the audience. Quebec became an important province in the discovery of the term paradiplomacy. This is because Quebec was better known as a province that is attached to the study of game theory related to the dynamics of nuclear conflict. Thus, Quebec has succeeded in becoming a prototype of a province capable of increasing the degree of the welfare of its citizens through the development of international partnerships with a number of provinces in Mexico (Tavares, 2016).

Furthermore, a number of researchers on the behaviour of local governments that conduct foreign cooperation began to emerge. Cornago carried out a number of interesting studies on paradiplomacy which focused on the implications of local governments conducting foreign cooperation on political preferences to become a new country. A very notable example is the study of a number of provinces in Spain, such as Catalan and Basque which have been intensively conducting paradiplomacy, and apparently has a positive correlation with the choice of secession from Spain (Cornago, 2018). Cornago's study then led to the rise of a new study of paradiplomacy called protodiplomacy.

A number of studies from Cornago then inspired a number of countries such as Canada, and the United States to restructure the relations of the regional-central government. This is done to ensure that the increasing intensity of foreign cooperation by regional governments does not disrupt a country's territorial integrity. This study was later developed by Cornago in terms of normalising foreign relations by local governments (Noé Cornago, 2010). The policy of the central government is important as a control mechanism for regional governments. In addition, this strategy is carried out so that local governments do not carry out other political agendas within the framework of improving people's welfare.

Meanwhile, paradiplomacy studies in Asia show a new pattern of local government behaviour in conducting foreign cooperation. The pattern of paradiplomacy practices in Asian countries are obviously different from European and North American countries. A number of studies in China, Japan, and India greatly show unique
phenomena. In the context of relations at the country level, for instance, relations between China and India tend to be conflictual (Pietrasiak et al., 2018). Likewise, the conflictual pattern occurred between Japan and China relationship at the state level (Shen, 2014). Nevertheless, the tensions between central governments do not preclude the initiative of the regional governments to conduct paradiplomacy. The central government should not much intervene with the non-political relations of regional governments to improve the welfare of the people.

However, it cannot be denied that international relations students and researchers’ interest to study paradiplomacy is lacking. Paradiplomacy is perceived to be insufficient to provide important explanations for changes in the structure of international relations in a larger level. The Kuznetsov and Cornago’s studies acknowledged that paradiplomacy debates tend to be still descriptive, normative and less productive to the development of new international relations theories (Cornago, 2010).

In line with Cornago's view, Kuznetsov who also refered to Andre Lecours's view that the international activities of local governments are merely trends, which sometimes emerge but then sink back (Kuznetsov, 2014). Paradiplomacy has not been seen as a study that will be able to significantly change the map of international relations. A number of literatures that describes paradiplomacy have substantive weaknesses, due to the absence of theoretical perspectives that can explain how local governments become international actors and are able to show the character and behaviour of foreign politics, international relations and negotiations. This weakness eventually makes it difficult for paradiplomacy researchers to carry out further studies (Royles 2017, Lecours 2003).

Nonetheless, the most recent study by Tavares on paradiplomacy shows a very broad and systematic dimension of paradiplomacy studies (Tavares, 2016). First, paradiplomacy studies with an emphasis on the constitutional dimension on how the constitution provides legal guarantees to the regions to carry out the authority of foreign cooperation. Second, paradiplomacy studies using the federalist dimension on how to study the behaviour of local government activities in the international arena as a mechanism for developing a more productive federal system. Third, paradiplomacy study using the dimension of nationalism, which is tracking the activities of foreign cooperation by local governments in the framework of the idea of achieving national interests effectively. Fourth, paradiplomacy in the dimension of International Relations (IR). This IR dimension emphasises how the emergence of new actors in international relations can change the pattern of future international relations. Fifth, paradiplomacy in the boundary
study dimension, namely how paradiplomacy activities are related to the dynamics of the meaning of the border. Will increasing border propagation activities lead to new border problems, or will new solutions be found in border management. Sixth, paradiplomacy in the dimension of globalisation. Namely, paradiplomacy that focuses on the study of the interrelation between the ideas of regionalism and globalisation, whether the increased intensity of paradiplomacy will further strengthen the flow of globalisation and erode the importance of regionalism.

Seventh, paradiplomacy in the dimension of the global economy, namely how paradiplomacy activities can enhance economic development and global trade. Does paradiplomacy actually facilitate economic and trade cooperation? Or will paradiplomacy cause stagnation in global development cooperation. Eighth, paradiplomacy in the environmental dimension, i.e. whether paradiplomacy will have an impact on strengthening global environmental regimes or actually weakening the standards of formation and compliance with global environmental regimes. Ninth, paradiplomacy in the diplomatic dimension, namely whether paradiplomacy will erode the authority of the central government in carrying out the practice of diplomacy, or paradiplomacy will further strengthen the struggle of a country’s diplomacy in international forums. And tenth, paradiplomacy in the dimension of separatism, namely whether the activity of paradiplomacy is an effective exit for a number of regions that have political aspirations to become a sovereign state.

This article focuses on paradiplomacy studies in the constitutional dimension. This study will make a comprehensive portrait of a number of norms established by the Indonesian government in the practice of paradiplomacy. The constitutional dimension of paradiplomacy builds a large framework that the policy is essentially foreign political authority as the exclusive right of the central government. The process of granting decentralised foreign policy to regional governments must be in line with the basic policy of foreign policy. Foreign cooperation conducted by the region must follow norms that have been developed by the central government to ensure the achievement of national interests in the articulation of foreign policy. As is the case with studies from Tavares (2018) that the United States government which has a federal state system, continues to place foreign policy authority at the central government level. The central government has the authority to cancel a number of cooperation agreements from the regional government, if the cooperation interferes with the achievement of national interests
globally, and conducts wrong procedures that can disrupt the communication process between the central government and other local governments (Tavares, 2016).

The principle of constitutionalism in paradiplomacy shows that anarchic international relations require more skills so that the process of interaction in the international system becomes productive. Full power in international cooperation is constitutionally inherent in the head of the central government, because it is assumed to have a sufficient number of tools and resources for interacting in the international system. Local governments who want to carry out international cooperation are required to follow procedures set by the central government. In the case of Indonesia, the airport development cooperation policy in Yogyakarta by the district leader in 2009 was eventually delayed because it was deemed not to have a procedural mandate from the central government.

Paradiplomacy in the constitutional dimension also traces the types of authority that can be decentralised by the central government to the regions in foreign policy matters. Are regional governments allowed to carry out negotiations in international cooperation, or are they merely communicating? Does the regional government have the authority to sign autonomously from an international collaboration, or is it merely carrying out the mandate given by the central government? Chaterjj & Saha (2017) showed that the decentralisation of paradiplomacy authority in states with federal systems tends to be broader compared to countries that embrace a unitary state system.

The hypothesis developed in this article is that Indonesian paradiplomacy architecture is strongly influenced by a centralised state system. Decentralisation in a unitary state system is more focused on domestic processes and affairs compared to the international aspects. The asymmetric-based, decentralised legal system also does not significantly affect the expansion of regional authority in international affairs.

**RESEARCH METHOD**

This is a quantitative research with content analysis to find out the number of special messages (signs) in a specific document. The documents are Indonesian law products related to foreign relations and international cooperation specifically undertaken by local governments. The government documents are obtained from six formal regulations, namely: Law no. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations Act, Law no. 24/2000 about International Agreement Act, Law no. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy of Papua, Law no. 23/2014 on Local Government, Law no. 11/2006 about the Government of Aceh, Law no. 13/2012
on Yogyakarta Special Region. All the regulations will be examined using content analysis (Roberts, 2015).

The articulation of diplomatic authority by the local government will be measured through a number of phrases (Krippendorff, 2004). First, the phrases on the local foreign cooperation and international agreements and its synonymic words, which are then given the code. Second, the phrases on the role of local government on foreign cooperation and international agreements and their synonymic words, which are then given the code. Third, the phrase on facilitation and consultation of the central government for the initiation of cooperation and international agreements by local governments and their synonymic words which is then given the code. Fourth, the phrase on the limitation and correction of the central government on the initiation of cooperation and international agreements by the local government and its synonymic words which are then given the code.

Fifth, the phrase on the institutionalisation of cooperation management and international agreements by national governments and local governments simultaneously and its synonymic words are then given code. Sixth, the phrase on the institutionalisation of cooperation management and international agreements by national governments and local government incrementally and its synonymic words which are then given code. The number of signs specified above is then verified for existence inside eight documents on international cooperation and agreements in Indonesia, which are then given codes and calculated according to the code made.

The next step is then to organize them into a frequency distribution table using descriptive statistical methods, to understand how often or articulate a message of paradiplomacy inside international cooperation and agreement documents in Indonesia. In the next section, we will demonstrate the result of this research and discussion.

**DISCUSSION**

This discussion does not include Jakarta as the Special Capital Region. As regulated in Law No. 9/2007, the specificity of Jakarta is more due to its position as the capital and is not included in the study of asymmetric decentralisation as a response to political dynamics. As stated in the basic considerations of Law No. 9/2007, Jakarta's specialty as an autonomous region domiciled as the Capital of the Republic of Indonesia needs to be given specific tasks, rights, obligations and responsibilities in the administration of regional government.
To understand the extent to which the practice of paradiplomacy in Indonesia, as mentioned earlier, we examine some acts related to foreign relations and international agreement using content analysis. From the empirical data, we have measured four issues on paradiplomacy practices in Indonesia which will be described more in this section.

The assessment concerning the practice of foreign relations and international agreements, as demonstrated in Table 1, depicts that the central government is definitely 100% dominant over local administration. There was no single word mentioning the local government’s role as an actor in international affairs. It means that, paradiplomacy was neglected local government pertaining diplomacy with international partners neither in administrative, economics, or political manner. Figure 1 can be illustrated as follow:

![Figure 1. Architecture of Actor in International Relation](image)

Source: Proceed data

At national level, parties which have strong involvement on the practice of foreign affairs are ministers (28%) and followed by president (27%). At the same time, in terms of international agreement, these state apparatuses are also dominant with 29% and the president in the second place around 20%. This is a strong indication that Indonesian diplomacy is totally state-centric. All aspects related to the practice of international diplomacy are occupied by the central government. There was very limited space for local government to be involved as actors in international arena. The trend of state-centric diplomacy in Indonesia is presumably caused by the pessimistic perception among government apparatus within the executive and legislative levels, during policy formulation. The central government learned from the separation of East Timor (Timor Leste), Aceh, and Papua if local government was given large authority on foreign relations. Due to political issues, the three provinces have intensively conducted
international diplomacy in order to gain international support for independence. As a result, these three provinces finally obtained different results, namely East Timor (independence), Aceh (special autonomy after Tsunami outbreak), and Papua (special autonomy).

Figure 1 also confirms that Indonesia’s international relations strongly stand upon realist point of views since the central government acts as a unitary actor. In contrast, local governments do not have adequate role on foreign affairs even on the lower political issues such as paradiplomacy. This is because the orientation of Indonesian foreign policy has been extremely determined by central government since the era of Sukarno, Suharto, Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administrations (Sukma, 2003). Table 1 depicts that the policy makers and legislators believe that under Indonesia’s political openness following political reformation in 1998, the practice of paradiplomacy should be managed and is necessary to be limited. The separation of East Timor was one of the reasons behind this policy. The two acts related to foreign affairs relations were concurrently enacted after separation of East Timor from Indonesia.

Meanwhile, the architecture of paradiplomacy, especially in the three autonomous provinces, is also interesting to be examined. This is because in the context of foreign relations, there is obvious result regarding the role of local and central government in international arena. The measure on the three acts on special autonomy region can be demonstrated as follow.

![Figure 2. Architecture of Actor in Local Government Act](source: Data proceed)
Figure 2 shows two contexts of paradiplomacy practices, namely local government and central government. As articulated in Table 1, it is indicated that the central government dominates over the local ones. However, Table 2, which emphasises more on the local acts demonstrates that local government actors have basically obtained significant percentage about 62%, while central government only have 37%. In the acts on local government based on asymmetric decentralisation, local government has more than 80% to 92%. Thus, the problem is whether there is positive correlation between power sharing given to local government with the articulation of local government on foreign affairs. We found out that the space for articulation of local government in the practice of paradiplomacy is still minor. There are no significant changes. The mention of local government actors in the context of the act actually shows that local actors do not have wider space for regional articulation, such as Governors or Regents wishing to travel abroad should apply for permission to the central government. Even the diction of local government actors to perform activities abroad is still limited to administrative role. The details are illustrated in table 1.

Table 1. The Authority of Actors on Foreign Relations

<table>
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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attending</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepting result</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulating</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorisation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storing</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalizing</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Letter of Authorisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Letter of credentials</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter of Mandate</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: Data proceed</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 shows strong evidence that the regulations of local government, whether symmetrically based on decentralisation or asymmetric decentralisation, do not give any authority at all to local governments to engage in a number of substantive foreign relations authorities and in international treaties.

The discussion on the scope of the authority of public relations and international agreements set forth in the law at the national level is not translated concretely in the regulation of local government law. This means that the orientation of local government’s law, in fact, is very inward-looking in the context of regional development instead of outward-looking policy. The activities of local government’s decision-makers only focus mainly on the proposal development and initiation. Whereas, the legislation activities will be managed dominantly by central government, and then play a role in the context of implementation of the legislative process already undertaken.

There is a pattern of mainstreaming authority related to foreign relations with the central government’s domination. Although the process of political democratisation provides widespread access to political, economic, and cultural decision-making at the local level, in fact, local government still lacks the authority to undertake international cooperation (Mukti, 2013). In globalisation and information technology eras that gives unlimited interaction opportunities including between local governments and communities, institutions and local governments with international partners, the situation is similar where local governments did not have more role to achieve local and national interest. A number of dictions related to international activities involving local government are perceived as formality, administrative, and technicalities only. Nonetheless, the research also found that in the context of the purpose of the acts related to foreign relations, it is only discussed in one diction only i.e. in the Aceh government law, while in the other laws, there is no single diction altogether related to the objective of foreign relations involving local government. The details are as follows.
Table 2. Diction on Foreign Relations by Local Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator on Goals</th>
<th>Foreign Relations Act</th>
<th>International Agreements Act</th>
<th>Local Govt. Act</th>
<th>Aceh Govt. Act</th>
<th>Yogyakarta Special Autonomy Act</th>
<th>Papua Special Autonomy Act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic Relations</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organisation Representative Office</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending Peacekeeping Troops/ Missions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organisation Representative Office</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution Establishment</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Cooperation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Agreement</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twins</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23.36%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data proceed

Table 2 shows that foreign relations goals are mostly regulated by central government with a percentage of about 68% and the remaining is local government about 32%. The authorities of local legislative act as observer, not as policy maker during international agreements, negotiations, and cooperation. The statement on foreign relations goals by local government can only be found in one article only, such as the Act of Local Government, Act of Aceh Governance, and Act of Papua Special Autonomy. Meanwhile, in the Act of Yogyakarta Special Province, there is no article related to the objective of the local government found. The Act of Aceh Governance has given a set of rules on international cooperation and agreements with a strong control by the central government. In other words, Aceh may establish paradiplomacy with international sister cities, yet “under certain conditions.” The term “under certain conditions” basically gives bigger room for the central government to supervise instead of giving more facilities to the local government.

Table 2 also depicts an interesting issue specifically related to the role of Aceh Province and Papua Province in the post new autonomy implementation. Aceh Province,
for instance, have changed the official name at least four times since the formation of the province from colonial era. Aceh Province has periodically transformed the name such as Aceh Darussalam (1511-1959), Daerah Istimewa Aceh/ Aceh Special Province (1959-2001), Nanggroë Aceh Darussalam (2001-2009), and finally Aceh (2009-present). The changes from Nanggroë Aceh Darussalam to Aceh is regulated under the Act of Governor of Aceh No. 46/2009 on the Usage of Name, Designation of Officers inside the government administrations in Aceh. It has been officially enacted since 7 April 2009. In the table 2, under the Act on Aceh Special Autonomy, Aceh is the only province in Indonesia which has the privilege to allow international organisation representative office to open in this province. In addition, Aceh is given bigger authority to conduct international cooperation in comparison to other regions.

In the meantime, the significant changes also occurred in Papua Province. In the early development, Papua Province was named as Irian Jaya Barat/West Irian Jaya when joined the Indonesian administration since 1969 to 1973. The name was changed by President Suharto during a contract negotiation with Freeport Indonesia Company for exploration until 2002. The name returned to Papua once central government in Jakarta granted special autonomy to the province under Act No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua. Due to the political dynamics in the province, there was a strong demand from Western Papua which intended to separate from Papua following the approval from central government under Act No. 45/1999 on the creation of West Papua Province. Finally, under Government Act No. 24/2007 West Papua Province were established and granted Special Autonomy Province. The capital city for Papua is Jayapura, while West Papua’s capital is Manokwari City (Sumule, 2003; Sollosa, 2005; Rathgeber, 2006; Muttaqin, 2014). Compared to Aceh, Papua has different authority in one aspect, namely international agreement, which was not granted to Aceh and Yogyakarta. This is an interesting issue, since Papua is under serious threat of separatism following the rise of the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM). The ultimate goal for OPM is to be independent from Indonesia and it has, from time to time, gained international attention (Final Report, 2003). The implementation of paradiplomacy policy, of course, will indirectly touch some “local” issues during negotiations with international partners. Therefore, in the context of regulation, the role of local government must be understood as mentioned in Table 3.
Table 3. Comparison between number of article and number of dictions on paradiplomacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Local Govt. Act</th>
<th>Aceh Govt. Act</th>
<th>Yogyakarta Special Autonomy Act</th>
<th>Papua Special Autonomy Act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of articles</td>
<td>Article on Paradiplomacy</td>
<td>Number of articles</td>
<td>Article on Paradiplomacy</td>
<td>Number of articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>409</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>101, 154, 207</td>
<td>9, 23, 24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Proceed data

Table 3 shows the articulation of paradiplomacy in the three special provinces in Indonesia in the context of the role of local government. From the diction assessed, there is a contrast picture between local government and central government. There is only 1% in average of the total articles in all Acts which mention paradiplomacy as the main point. In the Act on Local Government, for instance, of the total number of articles is 409, there are only three articles that mention paradiplomacy: article 101, 154, and 207. Whereas, the 406 remaining articles do not mention specifically about paradiplomacy. The same trend also exists in the Act on Aceh Special Autonomy. Only three articles mention paradiplomacy clearly, namely 9, 23, and 24. While in the remaining 270 articles, the diction of paradiplomacy cannot be found. In contrast to this, there is no single word that mentions paradiplomacy activity in the Act on Yogyakarta Special Autonomy which has only 51 articles. The Act on Papua Province also has three article which specifically mention paradiplomacy. Yet, in term of percentage, Papua Province Act is bigger compared to other two special provinces due to the number of the article in the Act on Papua Special Autonomy which contains only 79 articles.

The move forward of the two Indonesian special provinces, namely Aceh and Papua is the consequences of political reality in the two regions. Both provinces have a long time of “struggle” against the Indonesian central government in Jakarta. There have been some disappointments inside the two provinces due to economic and political disparities between Jakarta and the two provinces. In Aceh for instance, the conflict between Aceh people and the government of Indonesia was triggered at least by four factors, namely bad treatment, implementation of Islamic Law, natural resources division, and the domination of Javanese people over the locals in Aceh. The conflict reached its
peak following the formation of an armed movement in Aceh called Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM). Consequently, the Indonesian government imposed a rule to treat Aceh as an “area of special military operation” or Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM) (Ross, 2005; Miller, 2009; Missbach, 2012).

In the meantime, the same problem also happened in Papua Province. As it was mentioned previously, the ultimate objective of OPM is independence. Beside economic and political disparities between Papua and Jakarta, the rise of Papua’s movement against the Indonesian government was mainly triggered by bad treatment especially from Indonesian military apparatus. The main issues which arose in international arena is the allegedly brutal action of Indonesian army such as Indonesia’s special forces Kopassus and Indonesian police force Brimob. Not only through military action, the struggle of Papuan to gain independence was also conducted through international forums such as United Nations (UN) (Bell, Feith, & Hatley, 1986; Bertrand, 1997; King, Elmslie, & Webb-Gannon, 2011). Therefore, the granting of special autonomy province to Papua is the solution of government of Indonesia to dampen anti-Indonesia movement, which has also taken place in Aceh.

Paradiplomacy practices in Yogyakarta is also an interesting case. Based on the Table 3, Act on Yogyakarta Special Province has 51 articles, but there is no diction that mention Yogyakarta has an authority on paradiplomacy practices. In fact, Yogyakarta has been given special status due to historical consequences. A long time before Indonesian independence, Yogyakarta was granted a special region status by the Dutch colonial or Zelfbestuurende Landschappen. The status also continued during Japanese rule that called Yogyakarta as Koti or Kooti. Both the Dutch and Japanese government classified Yogyakarta as State/Dependent State. The new government of Indonesia, under Sukarno’s administration also gave a special autonomy, yet the status changed from Dependent State to a Special Region (Pradoto, 2012). This autonomy is still running and, in some cases, problems concerning relationship between Yogyakarta and the central government in Jakarta emerge (Ratnawati, 2011). Nevertheless, some have criticised and even contested the special status of Yogyakarta especially related to the position of Sultan of Yogyakarta as governor for life. This became a political discourse amidst studies on Indonesia’s democratisation in the post-Suharto era (Rifayani, Harsasto, & Martini, 2013; Paryanto, 2016).

What about the phenomenon of the many collaborations by the regions in the form of sister provinces and sister cities? In the context of the six Acts that were discussed, the
term is not actually known in the nomenclature of the Act. Indeed, regulations related to
twin cities and twin provinces are actually only regulated at the ministry level under the
Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 3/2008 (Concerning Guidelines for
Implementing Regional Government Collaboration with Foreign Parties) and Foreign
Minister Regulation No. 3/2019 (Guideline on Foreign Relation by Local Government).
This shows that paradiplomacy norms are placed only as technical norms so that they do
not need to be regulated with higher norms.

The phenomenon of a large number of paradiplomacy activities by regions in
Indonesia turns out to be determined more by the quality of local government leaders in
building networks. The presence or absence of international cooperation by regions does
not become an indicator of regional performance measurement. The sister city and
province phenomena are found in many local governments in Java compared to those
outside of Java. A number of provinces and cities in Java have institutionalised diplomacy
supported by the availability of human resources, and a number of infrastructure access
such as airports that have international flights. At the same time, the regional government
in Java also has a network in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially the foreign
cooperation desk, so that a number of foreign cooperation that is carried out remains
within the corridor and overseen by the central government. The facilitation of the central
government in responding to regional creativity becomes a determining variable for the
creation of international cooperation practices.

What about a number of regions outside Java that have international cooperation?
There are a number of provinces outside Java that have paradiplomacy experiences, such
as Gorontalo province during Fadel Muhammad governor (Marzaman, 2018), Bantaeng
Regency during Nurdin Abdullah administration (Harakan, 2018), South Sulawesi under
the incumbent, West Sumatra under Irwan Prayitno governor (Detik.com), and West Nusa
Tenggara under Zainul Majdi governor dan the current era of Zulkieflimansyah
(Gatra.com). Regional leaders with a well-established experience in higher education tend
to have innovation and the ability to participate in international cooperation.

**CONCLUSION**

The architecture of paradiplomacy in Indonesia is still under the domination of central
government actors rather than the local ones. The central government also tend to be very
bureaucratic with too many administration rules. As a result, the number of international
cooperation conducted by local government is very low. Several regions are able to
establish international cooperation under the sister city or sister province schemes, and it is based more on the creativity of local government rather than the central government’s initiation and support. The unitary state system and the trauma caused by separatism movements such as in Aceh and Papua are the main variables that need to be discussed and learned more in order to get argumentative answer on why the architecture of Indonesia’s paradiplomacy tend to be procedural and too administrative in the next study. In the context of regulation, the central government is required to create more flexible laws that gives more authority to local government to conduct paradiplomacy practices. This is important in order to allow local government to improve their respective international cooperation and finally enhance people's welfare in the local regions.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY


**Note:**

1 Abbreviations included in this table are as follow: 1) int. refers to international; 2) govt. refers to government and governmental; 3) dom. refers to domestic.